Abstract. We consider a Bertrand duopoly model with unknown costs. The firms' aim is to choose the price of its product according to the well-known concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The chooses are made simultaneously by both firms.
INTRODUCTION
Let Fi and F2 be two firms, each producing a differentiated product. Both firms simultaneously choose the price for the corresponding good with the purpose to maximize their expected profit. We consider an economic model in which we suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We suppose that firm Fi 's unitary production cost is CA with probabihty ^ and CB with probabihty 1 -^ (where CA > CB), and firm F2's unitary production cost is CH with probabihty 9 and CL with probability 1-0 (where CH > ci). Both probabihty distributions of unitary production costs are common knowledge. In this work, we determine the prices in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium for the above model, and we analyze the advantages, for firms and for consumers, of using the technology with highest production cost versus the one with cheapest production cost. We prove that the expected profit of each firm increases with the variance of its production costs. We also show that the expected price of each good increases with both expected production costs, being the effect of the expected production costs of the rival dominated by the effect of the own expected production costs.
THE MODEL AND THE EQUILIBRIUM
We consider an economy with a monopolistic sector with two firms, Fi and F2. Firm Fi produces a substitutable product / at a constant marginal cost, for / G {1,2}. The firms simultaneously choose prices, respectively, pi>0 and p2 > 0. The direct demands are given by qi = a-pi + bpj, where qt stands for quantity, a > 0 is the intercept demand parameter and I7 > 0 is a constant representing how much the product of one firm is a substitute for the product of the other. For simplicity, we assume b < I. These demand functions are unrealistic in that one firm could conceivably charge an arbitrary high price and stiU have a positive demand provided the other firm also charges a high enough price. However, this function is chosen to represent a linear approximation to the "true" demand function, appropriate near the usual price settings where the equilibrium is
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where 0 < c < a is the unitary production cost for both firms. Here, we suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them following a certain probabihty distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. The following probabihty distributions of the firms' production costs are common knowledge among both firms: _ , CA with probabihty ^ ^ ' CB with probabihty l-(p ' " _ j CH with probabihty 9 ^ ^ \ CL with probabihty 1-0
We suppose that CA > CB, CH > CL and CA,CB,CH,CL < a. Moreover, we suppose that the highest unitary production cost of any firm is greater than the lowest unitary production cost of the other one, that is, CA > CL and CH> CBFirms' profits, ni and 112, are given by
where the price/),(c,) depends on the unitary production cost c,-of firm Z^-, for /G {1,2}. Theorem 1. Let E{Ci) = ^CA + {I -^)CB be the expected unitary production cost of firm Fi, and let £{€2) = 9CH + (1 -d)cL be the expected unitary production cost of firm F2. For the Bertrand model with uncertainty costs considered, the Bayesian Nash equilibrium is
,, , 2a{2
,, , 2a{2 + b) + {4-b^)cH + b^E{C2)+2bE{Ci)
Proof. If firm Fi 's unitary production cost is high, PI{CA) is the solution of
and if it is low, PI{CB) is the solution of
max{e{a-pi+bp2icH))ipi-CB) + ii-0){a-pi+bp2icL))ipi-CB))-Pl>0
If firm F2's unitary production cost is high, PI{CH) is the solution of
max{^{a-p2 + bpl{cA)){p2-CH) + {l-^){a-p2 + bp*i{cB)){p2-CH)); P2>0
and if it is low, PI{CL) is the solution of
max{<j){a-p2 + bpl{cA))ip2-CL) + ii-<l>)ia-p2 + bpl{cB))ip2-CL))-P2>0
Solving these maximization problems, we obtain equalities (l)- (4) .
From this theorem we get Corollaries 1 and 2.
Corollary 1. The expected price, E{pl), of the good produced by firm Fi is given by
and the expected price, E{pl), of the good produced by firm F2 is given by
Proof. The expected market prices, E{pl) and £(/?!), of the goods produced by firms Fi and F2 are determined, respectively, by E{pl) = PI{CA)<1>+plicB)ii -<l>) and E{p2) = P2icH)6 + P2icL)ii -6)-Using equalities (l)- (4), we get the results.
•
The effect of the probabihties ^ and 9 over the expected prices is shown in Figure 1 , for some parameter region of the model. The expected prices are lower in the case of independent goods than in the case of differentiated goods.
A B and firm F2's expected profit £'(;r|) is given by
Proof. The results follow by putting the quantities (l)- (4) The effect of the probabifities (p and 0 over the firms' expected profits is shown in Figure 2A for the case of independent goods (b = 0), and in Figure 2B for the case of differentiated goods (b = 0.9), for some parameter region of the model. We see that both firms profit more in the case of differentiated goods than in the case of independent goods.
A 
CONCLUSIONS
We showed that the expected profit of each firm increases with the variance of its production costs. We also showed that the expected price of each good increases with both expected production costs, being the effect of the expected production costs of the rival dominated by the effect of the own expected production costs.
